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Abstract 
Some considerations on the paradox presented by Japanese civil society in the 
context of the 3.11 triple disaster that hit Japan in 2011. 
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1. Janus of the 3.11 disaster 
 
The tragic disaster of 3.11 was Janus-faced. On the one hand, there was the 
natural aspect of the huge earthquakes and tsunami endured by the Japanese 
people; the world showed admiration for their bravery. On the other hand, there 
was the artificial aspect in terms of series of accidents involving nuclear power 
plants built by men and their secrecy that has frustrated the citizens of the world. 
 
The earthquake and tsunami took many lives, but it was Japan’s civil society that 
helped limit the damage and provide support for the survivors. For instance, due 
to the indispensable role civil society organizations played in Japan at the time, 
there were no occurrences of opportunistic price rise in Japanese consumer goods. 
In fact on the contrary, the price of goods in the stricken areas such as Fukushima 
and Sendai went down, as can be seen in figure 1. below. 
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(Yoji Inaba 2015: 17) 
Fig. 1: Consumer Price Before and After 3.11 
 
 
What happened on 3.11 and its aftermath showed that disasters can be 
devastating but that they can also bring out the best in people and civil 
society. The international community expressed its admiration for Japanese 
people and society for the way in which they cooperated and confronted their 
hardships and difficulties. 
 
However, nuclear power plants have had a continuous history of problems which 
are still ongoing in Japan. It is still difficult to evaluate the damage from the 
nuclear accidents and the problems are likely to continue for many years. In spite 
of its high technology and the diligent and sincere labor attitude of its people, 
Japan did not know how to cope with the series of accidents at the Tokyo Electric 
Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi Plant, the severity of which was 
rated ‘level 7’, the highest on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event 
Scale. Behavior by political leaders in the cabinet as well as the TEPCO CEOs 
revealed their lack of preparedness in terms of crisis management.  
 
One shocking example concerning the problem of the nuclear power plants is 
shown in figure 2. below. The figure compares eighty-nine nuclear power plants 
located along coastlines of twenty countries for height of sea wall and average 
height of the biggest waves recorded within a 150 kilometer radius. 
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This figure shows the average big-wave heights minus sea wall heights. For the 
safety of nuclear power plants, we prefer negative numbers, but we find that five 
of the six nuclear plants with insufficient sea wall heights are Japanese, including 
the Fukushima Daiichi. This clearly indicates that Japanese nuclear plants are 
extremely vulnerable.  
 
 
(Lipscy et.al. 2013: 6086) 
Fig. 2: Comparison of Nuclear Power Plants in 20 Countries 
Sea Wall Height vs. Average Wave Height 
 
Now my question is: what could account for such contrasting faces of the 3.11 disaster? 
 
2. Two faces of Civil Society in Japan 
 
I would like to answer the question from the perspective of civil society. My 
answer to which actually reveals the face and reverse-side of Japanese civil 
society and liberal democracy. 
 
Figure 3. below maps out Japanese civil society around 2007. Except for 
government-related organizations, private companies, and organizations located in 
the left and right-hand areas of the map, our JIGS survey (Tsujinaka and Kubo 
2013) can analyze almost all civil society organizations, especially those located 
in the center of the map. 
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Fig. 3: Civil Society Map of Japan 
 
Japanese civil society has very thick and stubborn grass-roots associations. The 
typical example is the 300,000 Neighborhood Associations (NHA, Jichikai or 
Chonaikai) which constitute the key source of social capital, functioning as hubs 
of various community organizations. They also provide infrastructure for the 
well-being of the people, (located in the right-central grey area of the map).  
 
Socially and economically speaking, there also exist a variety of socio-economic 
organizations that can be characterized as half-private and half-public based on 
more than 100 specific laws in Japan. In addition, there are many other 
straightforward private associations (in the forms of incorporated associations, 
foundations, chambers of commerce, etc.). The long dominance of the LDP since 
1955 is mainly attributed to the role that these social groups have played as 
contributors or supporters of their campaign. 
 
On the other hand, left-leaning radical and/or social movements had good 
relations with progressive parties (Socialist until 1996, Communist, Democratic 
Party since 1996, etc.) which had relatively weak ties with the local grass-roots 
organizations and socio-economic associations mentioned above. In general, the 
type of organizations designed for social movements lacked the centralization (as 
the national centers) and professionalization that are required at the center of 
power in Japan. 
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Prior to the disaster, many of these same local grass-roots associations and 
socio-economic organizations kept relatively quiet and, since they received subsidies 
from local governments and TEPCO, never mobilized anti-nuclear plant movements. 
 
 
 (Kamps 2006) 
Fig. 4: Public Works Investment per GDP 1960-2001 
 
Despite strong investment in public works (internationally speaking the amount is 
higher in terms of ratio to GDP in comparison to US, France, Italy, Germany and 
UK, see Fig.4. above), the Japanese government failed to ensure the security of 
the nuclear power plants of the major electric power companies. They chose to 
construct legitimacy as they invested in the ‘software’ of public relations (an 
estimated 20 billion EURO in total) rather than investing in reform of the 
‘hardware’ of nuclear power plants to build a safer system (Kamikawa 2016). 
 
The Japanese ‘conservative’ political system (when the 3.11 disaster occurred the 
government was controlled by a non-LDP coalition led by the Democratic Party 
of Japan*) responded poorly to the Fukushima disaster. Even after the disaster, 
both the LDP and the DPJ hesitated to face the nuclear energy problem and make 
it an issue of their platform for the general election, vaguely repeating their 
slogans for revitalizing and rebuilding Japan from the disaster instead. 
Consequently, the LDP have won three times in the nationwide elections since 
2012, basically because they have a relatively sturdy infrastructure in civil society 
in their constituents while the opposition camps have remained divided. 
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Key: Blue=Yes; Green=No; Red=Neutral 
Fig. 5: Public Opinion toward Nuclear Energy in Japan 
Before and After 3.11: 2007-2013 
 
Although the majority of public opinion was anti-nuclear energy, the public could 
not organize and unify their voice in civil society, thus their opinion failed to be 
reflected in the political arena. 
 
 
Fig. 6: News Articles (5 major papers) Anti-Nuclear Power Movement 
2011-2014 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2
0
1
1
年
3
月 5月 7月 9月
1
1
月
2
0
1
2
年
1
月 3月 5月 7月 9月
1
1
月
2
0
1
3
年
1
月 3月 5月 7月 9月
1
1
月
2
0
1
4
年
1
月 3月
朝日 毎日 読売 産経 日経
 The Paradox of Civil Society: Japan after the 3.11 Disaster 
 
 − 201 − 
The Fukushima nuclear disaster revealed that the Japanese political system was 
unable to respond to the nuclear crisis squarely. Although Japanese civil society 
showed social resilience, solidarity, and coherence in response to the earthquake 
and tsunami devastation, Japan as a whole failed to keep nuclear plants in check 
prior to the accidents and did not declare its support of the majority of anti-nuclear 
Japanese citizens whose organizations were weak and lacked political foundation.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, civil society in Japan has been well-developed and organized, 
which is why the conservative establishment comprising politicians, bureaucrats, 
and TEPCO has tried very hard to form and maintain their coalition with civil 
society organizations. In fact, conservatives have succeed in keeping this coalition 
alive even after the disaster. They have adopted the strategy of ‘non-decision 
making’ as they have intentionally avoided making judgments on the nuclear 
disaster (Tsujinaka 2016). To say the least, they have succeeded in preventing 
nuclear energy from becoming an issue in political elections so far. 
 
 
                                                 
*
A DPJ coalition had formed the government from 2009, which was the first time since its establishment in 
1996. Between 1955 and 2016 the LDP lost power only twice, in 1993-94 and again in 2009-12. 
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